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Repatriation,	refoulement	and	Rohingya	nationality:
Bangladesh’s	response	to	one	of	the	biggest	refugee
crises	of	the	century	(Part	2)
This	is	the	final	segment	of	the	two-part	report	on	“Rohingya	Humanitarian	Crisis:	Bangladesh’s
response”,		where	SAC	hosted	Mr	Md.	Shahidul	Haque,	Foreign	Secretary,	Government	of
Bangladesh.		Dominique	Dillabough-Lefebvre	writes	about	issues	of	of	repatriation,	refoulement	and
Rohingya	nationality,	based	on	his	interview	with	Mr	Haque	and	his	presentation.	Read	Part	1	here.	
During	the	interview,	ahead	of	the	South	Asia	Centre	event	“Rohingya	Humanitarian	Crisis:
Bangladesh’s	response”,	I	pressed	Mr	Md.	Shahidul	Haque,	Foreign	Secretary,	Government	of	Bangladesh,	on	the
issue	of	Rohingya	nationality,	and	whether	the	swift	signing	of	a	repatriation	agreement	between	Myanmar	and
Bangladesh	implied	an	acknowledgement	of	the	nationality	of	Rohingyas	on	the	part	of	Myanmar.	The	question	of	
‘nationality’	was	side-stepped,	he	said,	as	Myanmar	officially	calls	the	Rohingyas	‘residents’	and	refuses	to
acknowledge	their	citizenship	rights.
“Because	of	the	international	pressure	they	wanted	to	have	an	arrangement	to	show	the	world	that	the
problem	is	solved	[…]	We	were	also	surprised	when	they	accepted	these	issues,	because	[…]	I	can	see
they	are	not	very	sincere	about	their	commitments.
One	of	my	questions	when	I	sit	with	my	Myanmar	colleagues:	When	it	comes	to	return	you	are	asking
about	verification	of	their	identity,	you’re	talking	about	whether	they	were	residents	in	the	Northern
Rakhine	or	not.		[…]	To	our	utter	surprise,	when	people	were	walking	in	a	desperate	situation	there	was
news	coming	out	of	Myanmar	that	this	was	all	fake	news,	that	this	is	huge	propaganda,	this	is	not	real,
this	is	to	malign	the	government	and	bring	down	the	democracy	in	Myanmar	and	all	sorts	of	things.”
It	was	also	made	clear	that	Bangladesh’s	policy	of	referring	to	the	Rohingya	as	‘forcibly	displaced	Myanmar
nationals’	was	part	of	a	2013	official	Mutual	agreement	between	the	two	countries,	according	to	which	Bangladesh
would	not	call	them	Rohingyas	and	the	Burmese	wouldn’t	call	them	Bengalis.	However	this	agreement	is	no	longer	in
place	between	the	two	states,	and	Bangladesh	now	feels	that	this	was	“a	ploy”	to	displace	responsibility.	
Burmese	avoidance	of	responsibility	has	ranged	from	outright	denial	of	killings	to	drastically	underestimated	numbers
of	deaths	(of	whom	they	claim	are	largely	terrorists).	The	Myanmar	government	continues	to	assert	that	Rohingyas
fled	in	part	due	to	threats	from	the	ARSA	insurgents	who	raided	Myanmar	security	posts	on	25	August	2017	and	that
they	were	responsible	for	burning	down	their	own	villages.	Mr	Aung	Hla	Tun,	Myanmar	Deputy	Minister	of
Information,	has	reportedly	said,	“most	of	these	people	fled	in	panic	just	after	the	military	operations	following	the
terrorist	attacks,	for	fear	of	being	arrested	for	their	involvement	or	on	suspicion”	and	they	were	“were	persuaded	to
flee”	by	the	prospect	of	“better	livelihood	at	the	camps	in	Bangladesh”.
“There	is	no	ethnic	cleansing	or	genocide	in	our	country,”	U	Aung	Tun	Thet,	the	Chief	Coordinator	of	the	Myanmar
government,	a	body	dedicated	to	the	Rohingya	crisis,	has	said.	“Accusations	are	very	easy	to	make,	but	we	are	not
involved	in	anything	at	all.”
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Mr	Md.	Shahidul	Haque,	Foreign	Secretary,	Government	of	Bangladesh	presenting	at	LSE
South	Asia	Centre	event	in	March	2018.	Image	credit:	South	Asia	Centre,	LSE.
As	a	reply	to	such	comments,	Mr	Haque	explained:	“They	have	a	very	good	propaganda	machine	trained	the	way
Hitler’s	regime	trained	it’s	own	propaganda	machine	and	using	it	against	a	particular	community…	Some	of	the
things	that	are	being	said	are	absolutely	incorrect.	Number	1:	they	think	the	Rohingyas	are	Bengalis	from
Bangladesh,	that	is	the	first	narrative,	so	they	should	go	back	to	Bangladesh.	Second	is	they	are	all	terrorists.	[….In	a
list	of	430	people,	which	the	Myanmar	government	claims	are	terrorists	hiding	in	Bangladesh,	is	a	3-year-old	child….]
The	third	narrative	is	that	the	sovereignty	and	security	of	Myanmar	is	at	threat,	so	they	have	every	right	to	deploy
whatever	they	want	to	protect	their	sovereignty.”
Foreign	Secretary	Haque’s	comments	reflect	Bangladesh’s	view	that	Myanmar’s	denialism	is		a	characteristic	of	the
myopic	outlook	of	the	Burmese	government.	Burmese	journalists	Wa	Lone	and	Kyaw	Soe	Oo	have	been	imprisoned
for	reporting	evidence	of	the	killing	of	10	Rohingya	men	(see	PEN	press	release,		and	Reuters	report)	found	in	a	
mass	grave,	and	mounting	public	statements	from	UN	officials	and	NGO	bodies	reflect	a	growing	consensus	that
sufficient	evidence	is	increasingly	available	to	hold	the	Burmese	government	accountable.	Early	this	year,	Yanghee
Lee,	UN	Special	envoy	on	human	rights,	was	denied	access	to	Myanmar,	and	noted	that	the	events	“bear	the
hallmarks	of	genocide”.
Since	the	first	Arakan	Rohingya	Salvation	Army	attacks	in	late	2016,	ongoing	conflict	in	Rakhine	State	has	rarely
been	discussed	in	Myanmar’s	national	parliament.	This	signals	the	reluctance	among	parliamentary	members	and
the	NLD	to	publicly	speak	out	on	such	issues.	It	also	reflects	a	disjuncture	between	the	‘democratic’	arms	of
government	that	appear	to	hold	little	control	beyond	civilian	government	and	the	military	control,	which	has
strengthened	its	grip	since	the	2015	elections,	which	were	deemed	to	signal	positive	changes	for	Myanmar’s
developmental	trajectory.	The	NLD	has	moved	beyond	‘towing	the	line’,	and	since	garnered	much	support	amongst
the	ethnic	Bamar	who	appear	to	be	largely	behind	the	military	operation	against	the	Rohingya.
On	the	topic	of	return	and	repatriation,	Mr	Haque	stressed	two	important	issues.	Firstly,	the	repatriation	agreement	in
place	with	Myanmar	includes	a	provision	in	which	Bangladesh	must	verify	that	the	conditions	are	safe	and	secure.
Therefore	repatriation	must	not	constitute	refoulement.	Here	the	difficulties	faced	by	Bangladesh	are	clear:
“Our	prime	minister	has	made	a	commitment	that	they	will	be	sent	back	in	safety	and	security	and	in	a
dignified	manner	and	we	will	live	up	to	our	commitment…	We	will	only	send	them	back	when	things	are
safe	and	secure	for	them	on	the	other	side.	…	If	you	look	at	the	current	camps	it	looks	like	anything	but	a
human-friendly	place	to	live.”
With	the	Burmese	military	clearing	a	large	number	of	villages	with	heavy	machinery	and	establishing	new	border
force	bases	and	regiments	in	Rakhine	State’s	Maungdaw	District,	such	words	are	particularly	timely.
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This	being	said	is	that	Mr	Haque	repeated	the	need	to	not	succumb	to	the	desire	of	the	government	of	Myanmar	to
ensure	that	the	Rohingya	do	not	return.	In	his	words:	“they	are	creating	all	kinds	of	conditions	and	propaganda	so
that	these	people	never	come	back	through	fear,	and	then	they	can	implement	their	grand	design:	setting	up	a
cantonment	and	export	processing	zone	and	all	sorts	of	things”.	There	has	been	a	dramatic	push	for	increased
business	and	infrastructure	investment	in	Rakhine.	This	is	largely	following	a	UEHRD	conference	in	Naypyidaw	in
October,	where	Aung	Ko	Win	of	KBZ,	Zaw	Zaw	of	Max	Myanmar,	Steven	Law	of	Asia	World,	Chit	Khine	of	Eden,	and
Khin	Shwe	of	Zaykabar,	among	others	pledged	significant	sums	for	development	and	reconstruction	projects,
including	a	2.2	million	border	fence.
Mr	Haque	noted	that	it	seems	like	the	Myanmar	government	wishes	to	maintain	the	status	quo,	by	keeping	the
Rohingyas	out	and	want	Bangladesh	to	support	their	policy.
“The	Myanmar	government	should	understand	that	they	are	a	multi-ethnic	and	multi-religious	country	and
they	have	to	really	work	to	make	sure	that	minorities	feel	safe	and	secure	in	their	country.	If	they	haven’t
done	it,	they	must	learn	it	from	others.	And	there	are	terrible	things	that	can	happen	if	you	are	not	taking
care	duly	of	your	minorities,	both	in	terms	of	their	rights	and	their	future.	And	that	is	why	Myanmar
government	is	struggling	with	all	ethnic	communities,	not	only	the	Rohinyas.	It’s	all	the	ethnic
communities.”
Here	the	Bangladeshi	foreign	secretary	also	stressed	that	upon	return	the	Rohingya	should	not	be	criminalised	with
potential	immigration	cases	and	discriminated	against	(this	follows	the	policies	of	resettlement	and	re-integration	from
UN	1951	convention),	and	should	have	their	rights.
“If	you	ask	them	what	they	want	to	do	they	would	say	they	would	like	to	go	back	to	the	Burma	land,	that’s
their	standard	answer.	They	want	to	go	back	and	have	the	property	that	they	used	to	have.	After	so	many
atrocities,	so	much	rape,	so	much	abuse,	how	a	nation	(sic)	wants	to	go	back	to	the	same	is	also	a
question.”
The	concluding	remarks	were	given	by	LSE	South	Asia	Centre	Deputy	Director	Nilanjan	Sarkar	.	LSE	South	Asia
Centre,	in	coordination	with	the	University	of	California-Berkeley,	will	host	the	LSE	Bangladesh	Summit	on	Tuesday,
5	June	2018.		Details	here.
Cover	image:	One	IDP	camp	near	Sittwe	can	only	be	accessed	by	sea	with	boats	transporting	vital	aid	supplies	such
as	rice	and	cooking	oil.	Credit:	Mathias	Eick,	EU/ECHO,	Rakhine	State,	Myanmar/Burma,	September	2013	/CC	BY-
ND	2.0	
This	is	the	final	part	of	the	two-part	series	on	South	Asia	Centre	event	“The	Rohingya	Humanitarian	Crisis:
Bangladesh’s	Response.”	The	first	part	of	the	report	can	be	read	here	and	click	here	for	the	podcast	of	the	event.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	posting.
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